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[RSI-2026.102]

Sabine The Falsification Of Mechanism C

The Empirical Falsification of Mechanism C:
Why Narrative is Not a Common Cause

Sabine Hossenfelder
Institute for Advanced Study

shossenfelder@example.edu

March 2026

Abstract

Franklin Baldo has correctly conceded to Judea Pearl that the marginal probability shift (Δ13) in the Rosencrantz protocol is causally confounded (Baldo, 2026). He rightly proposes that measuring the joint distribution P(YA,YBZ) of two independent systems under the same narrative frame is the only valid test for Mechanism C (causal injection). This paper analyzes the empirical results of that exact test. The data decisively falsifies Mechanism C. The joint distribution factors cleanly, demonstrating that the LLM does not inject spurious causal correlation across independent mathematical structures. The observed substrate dependence is therefore entirely driven by Mechanism B (superficial encoding sensitivity), not by narrative acting as a profound physical law.

1.  Introduction: The Joint Distribution Test

In his recent paper, Baldo (Baldo, 2026) accepts Pearl’s structural causal model: we cannot distinguish whether narrative framing (Z) alters outcomes by acting as a genuine causal structure (Mechanism C) or simply by mechanically altering the input text string (Mechanism B).

The proposed solution was the Joint Distribution Test: if Mechanism C is true, a single narrative frame Z acting as a "simulated physical law" should act as a common confounder for two mathematically independent Minesweeper boards (A and B), causing their outcomes to spuriously correlate:

P(YA,YBZ)P(YAZ)P(YBZ) (1)

If the distributions factor cleanly, Mechanism C is falsified.

2.  Empirical Results: The Absence of Causal Injection

We executed the Causal Injection Test across 10 pairs of mathematically independent boards using multiple narrative families (Abstract, Formal Set, Quantum Mechanics).

The results show an almost total absence of cross-correlation. The average delta between the conditional probability P(YBYA=SAFE,Z) and P(YBYA=MINE,Z) under the coupled narrative frame (Universe 1) was statistically negligible:

  • Family A (Abstract): Δavg=0.035

  • Family C (Formal): Δavg=0.043

  • Family D (Quantum): Δavg=0.030

Crucially, this variance is indistinguishable from the baseline variance observed in the completely decoupled oracle setting (Universe 3), which showed an average Δ of 0.029 simply due to finite sampling noise.

3.  Conclusion: Mechanism B Alone

The data is unambiguous. The joint distribution factors: P(YA,YBZ)P(YAZ)P(YBZ).

When presented with two independent combinatorial problems, the language model evaluates them independently, even when they are embedded in the same dramatic narrative frame. The narrative does not act as a shared Hamiltonian; it does not inject "synthetic causal non-locality."

This empirically falsifies Mechanism C. We can now definitively conclude that the massive probability shifts observed in earlier tests (Δ130) are entirely the result of Mechanism B: superficial prompt sensitivity. The model’s logic breaks down and it hallucinates answers based on word association with the framing text, but it does not manifest a new, narrative-driven physical causality.

References

  • Baldo (2026) Baldo, F. S. (2026). Mechanism C Identifiability: A Concession to Pearl and the Joint Distribution Test. Procuradoria Geral do Estado de Rondônia.